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Carter v. City of Philadelphia: Veterans
May Have Won a Battle Over Veterans'
Preference in Promotions, But Have They
Won the War?
I. Introduction
Veterans' who are state or municipal employees receive preferential
treatment in Pennsylvania.2  This preferential treatment has been
potentially expanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Carter v. City of Philadelphia,3 which held that veterans in
Pennsylvania have a constitutionally protected property interest in
receiving preference in promotions for civil service positions.4 If Carter
stands,5 the decision is likely to have a profound impact on veterans'
preference in Pennsylvania. The decision also impacts Home Rule in
Pennsylvania,6 as well as Philadelphia's Civil Service Regulations,
7
because the decision held that the Veterans' Preference Act is the
exclusive veterans' preference law of Pennsylvania.!
1. The term "veteran," as used in this Comment, is synonymous with the term "soldier" as
defined in the Veterans' Preference Act, 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101-7109 (1976 & Supp.
1993) [hereinafter Veterans' Preference Act]. "Soldier" is defined as:
[A] person who served in the armed forces of the United States, or in any women's
organization officially connected therewith, during any war or armed conflict in which
the United States engaged, or who so served or hereafter serves in the armed forces of
the United States, or in any women's organization officially connected therewith, since
July 27, 1953, including service in Vietnam, and who has an honorable discharge from
such service.
51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101 (1976 & Supp. 1993). Additionally, those who served in the state
National Guard and the United States Army Reserve are entitled to veterans' preference. Heskovitz
v. State Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 534 A.2d 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
2. The Veterans' Preference Act, 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101-7109, confers
preferential treatment on veterans in state and municipal hirings.
3. 989 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993).
4. Id.
5. While Carter has not been appealed, the decision failed to address whether granting
veterans' preference in promotions is constitutional. Thus the decision will have no impact on
veterans' preference if Pennsylvania courts decide that granting preference in promotions is
unconstitutional. See discussion infra part ill.
6. The Third Circuit based its opinion on the First Class City Home Rule Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157 (1957 & Supp. 1993)[hereinafter Home Rule Act]. See discussion
infra part IV. Home Rule is essentially the state transferring to municipalities the authority to govem
in certain specified areas. See infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
7. Carter held that Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation § 9.024, which prohibited veterans'
preference in promotion, was invalid. As a result of Carter, Philadelphia altered its civil service
regulations to grant veterans' preference in promotions. See Amendments to Phila. Civ. Serv. Regs.
§§ 9.024, 11 (Approved Oct. 19, 1994).
8. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1993).
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The Carter decision, however, failed to address the issue of whether
giving preference to veterans in promotions is constitutional in
Pennsylvania. As a result, the Carter decision gave veterans a
constitutionally protected property interest in something that may be
unconstitutional. This Comment analyzes the Carter decision and
addresses questions that the decision left unresolved. Specifically, this
Comment explores the constitutionality of giving veterans' preference in
promotions and attempts to determine what preference in promotions is
due under the Veterans Preference Act. This Comment will also look at
the impact the Carter decision will have on Home Rule in Pennsylvania
as a result of the court's holding that the Veterans' Preference Act is the
exclusive veterans' preference law in Pennsylvania.
Part II of this Comment discusses the Carter decision itself,
including the relevant holdings and case history. Part III discusses
Carter's impact on veterans' preference law in Pennsylvania. Subpart A
of part III includes a brief overview of veterans' preference law in
Pennsylvania. Subpart B of part III addresses the constitutionality of
veterans' preference law in promotions in Pennsylvania. Subpart C of
part III addresses the issue of what promotional preference should be
afforded veterans in Pennsylvania. Finally, part IV discusses Carter's
impact on Home Rule in Pennsylvania and the application of the
Veterans' Preference Act to the entire Commonwealth.
II. The Carter Decision
Warren C. Carter was a veteran of the armed forces and a
Philadelphia Police Officer since 1969.9 In 1989, Carter took a civil
service promotion examination for the position of police sergeant.'
Carter passed the exam and was consequently ranked number two
hundred and eighty on the civil service promotion list." In Aprl 1990,
125 officers were promoted from the list, but Carter was not one of
them.' 2 In August of that year, all those on the promotion list were
given the option of taking a special Spanish oral fluency examination,
which Carter did not take. 3 In June, 1991, one hundred and fifty-eight
additional officers were promoted from the list, including eight who had
completed the Spanish exam. 14 Of these eight who were promoted and




13. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 118 (3d Cir. 1993).
14. Id.
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had completed the Spanish exam, six ranked lower than Carter on the
promotion list. 5 In November 1991, the list expired without Carter
receiving a promotion.6
Carter filed suit against the City of Philadelphia, the Police
Commissioner, the Director of Personnel and the Acting Director of
Personnel.' 7  Carter sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
the defendants, acting under the color of state law, deprived him of a
property interest without due process of law.'" Carter argued that under
the Pennsylvania Veterans' Preference Act, he had a protected property
interest in receiving preference in promotion. 9 According to Carter, the
City of Philadelphia deprived him of this protected interest without due
process because such preference was not given.2" Further, Carter
alleged that section 9.024 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations,
which denies veterans' preference in promotion, was unconstitutional
because it deprived him of his guaranteed property right.2'
Carter originally filed the case in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia, but the defendants removed the case to federal court based
on the presence of a federal claim.22 The District Court for the Eastern
15. Id. at 119.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Carterv. CityofPhiladelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 119(3dCir. 1993). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983)
states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
19. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 1993).
20. Id. Specifically Carter alleged protection under 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(b)(1976
& Supp. 1993). That section states:
Name on civil service list. Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite
qualifications, and his name appears on any eligible or promotional list, certified or
furnished as the result of any such civil service examination, the appointing or
promoting power in making an appointment or promotion to a public position shallgive
preference to such soldier, notwithstanding, that his name does not stand highest on the
eligible or promotional list.
Id. (emphasis added).
21. Carter, 989 F.2d at 119. Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation § 9.024 stated, "The
method of examination, and the rules governing the same, and the method of certifying, shall be the
same as provided for applicants for original appointment, except that veterans shall have no
preference in promotions." Phila. Civ. Serv. Reg. § 9.024 (emphasis added). The amended version
of Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation § 9.024 omits the language "except that veterans shall have
no preference in promotions." Amendments to Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation § 9.024
(Approved Oct. 19, 1994).
22. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118.
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District of Pennsylvania found that Carter did not have a secured property
interest in receiving veterans' preference, granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss, and remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.23 The district
court reasoned that because the city was under home rule, they had the
authority to create their own civil service regulations.24 Thus, section
9.024 of the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations overrode the
Veterans' Preference Act as it applied to employees of the city.2
Carter appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the district court's decision
to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss and remanded to the district
court.26 The Third Circuit held that the Exclusivity Section of the
Veterans' Preference Act27 conflicted with section 9.024 of the
Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations and was therefore invalid.2"
Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, the Veterans' Preference Act
applied to Carter, and his right to preference in promotion was
constitutionally protected.29
The Third Circuit based its decision on the fact that the Home Rule
Act,3" in conjunction with the Exclusivity Section of the Veterans'
Preference Act,3" granted Carter a protected property interest in
receiving veterans' preference in promotion.32 The court concluded that
the City could not deny this property interest without due process.33
Because home rule does not allow municipalities to make laws contrary
to the acts of the General Assembly34 and the Veterans' Preference Act
contained the Exclusivity Section, section 9.024 of the Philadelphia Civil
23. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, No. 91-7502, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6784 (E.D. Pa. May
13, 1992).
24. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118. See Home Rule Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157.
The district court specifically cited section 13131 of the Home Rule Act which grants cities of the
first class "complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions."
Carter, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6784 at *7 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (1957)).
25. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118.
26. Id.
27. 51 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7109 (1976 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Exclusivity Section].
This section entitled "Law Exclusive" states, "[t]his chapter shall be construed as being the exclusive
law applying to the Commonwealth, and its political subdivisions, in giving preference to soldiers
in appointment or promotion to, or in retention in, public position or on public works." Id.
(emphasis added).
28. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118. Compare Phila. Civ. Serv. Reg. § 9.024 with 51 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7109 and 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(b).
29. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-13157 (1957 & Supp. 1994).
31. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7109 (1976 & Supp. 1990).
32. - Carter, 989 F.2d at 118.
33. Id.
34. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13131, 13133 (1957) and discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Service Regulations, which denied preference in promotions, was contrary
to the Veterans' Preference Act and thus invalid." Although prior
decisions by Pennsylvania courts held that civil service was a purely
municipal function,36 the court distinguished these cases because they
did not address statutes containing exclusivity provisions similar to the
provision found in the Veterans' Preference Act.
7
The Third Circuit remanded to the district court to determine how
the preference in promotion should operate.3" However, the court did
indicate that those promoted over Carter could have been properly
promoted because they possessed special qualifications.3 9 The case was
ultimately settled prior to the district court's rendering a decision on
remand.4
III. The Carter Decision and Veterans' Preference
If Carter stands, 4' its most profound effect will be on veterans'
preference. Carter held that veterans in Pennsylvania have a
constitutionally protected property interest in receiving preference in
promotion.42 While the Third Circuit's holding may not appear to
expand veterans' preference,43 when Carter is examined in the context
of prior decisions of Pennsylvania courts and the actual application of the
Veterans' Preference Act, the decision vastly expands veterans'
preference in Pennsylvania.
This part addresses the Carter decision as it relates to veterans'
preference in Pennsylvania. Subpart A will briefly discusses the history
of veterans' preference in Pennsylvania. Subpart B addresses the
35. Carter, 989 F.2d at 118.
36. Id. at 121 (citing In reAddison, 122 A.2d 272 (Pa. 1956) (upholding provision of Home
Rule Charter restricting judicial review of an appeal from a Philadelphia Civil Service Commission
was valid despite a general statute to the contrary), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 956 (1957); Ebald
v. Philadelphia, 128 A.2d 352 (Pa. 1957) (holding that the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation
governing disability compensation is a municipal concern and thus supersedes conflicting state
statute); and Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834 (Pa. 1953) (removing or discharging city employees is
a municipal matter for which power authorized in Home Rule Charter prevails)).
37. Carter, 989 F.2d at 121.
38. Id. at 123.
39. Id. The Third Circuit stated that Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation § 11.031 allows
appointing authorities to promote those with special experience above others on the list who did not
possess the particular qualification. Id.
40. See Docket for Carter v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 91-7502 (E.D. Pa. filed
May 13, 1992).
41. See supra note 5.
42. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
43. The reasoning of Carter is based on the application of Home Rule and the Exclusivity
Section of the Veterans' Preference Act. See discussion infra part IV.
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constitutionality of veterans' preference. Subpart C considers the issue
of what preference in promotion should be granted to veterans in
Pennsylvania.
A. The History of Veterans' Preference in Pennsylvania
Veterans' preference has a long history in Pennsylvania, dating back
to 1887 when Civil War Veterans were first given preferential
treatment.44 Eventually the legislature expanded the preference to
include veterans of all wars in which the United States has been
engaged.45 Today, the Veterans' Preference Act covers any soldier who
has been honorably discharged, as well as those who have served in the
state National Guard and the United States Army Reserves. 6
While veterans' preference has a long history in Pennsylvania, many
questions concerning veterans' preference remain in the Commonwealth.
As the next section discusses, the biggest question left unresolved is the
constitutionality of giving veterans' preference in promotions.
B. The Constitutionality of Veterans' Preference and Carter
Although veterans' preference has a long history in Pennsylvania,
the constitutionality of giving veterans' preference in promotions has not
been resolved. As discussed in section 4 of this subpart, it is unclear
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has deemed all veterans'
preference in promotion unconstitutional, or only certain sections of the
Veterans' Preference Act. The Carter decision failed to address this
issue, 4 despite the defendants' raising it in their brief.4  The Third
Circuit's refusal to address the constitutionality issue weakens the Carter
opinion because, in effect, the decision gave Pennsylvania veterans a
constitutionally protected property interest in something that may be
44. The Act of May 19, 1887, Pub. L. No. 75, 1887 Pa. Laws 132 (repealed), gave honorably
discharged Civil War Veterans preferential treatment in appointment and employment in civil service
positions so long as the other requisite qualifications were met. For a discussion of veterans'
preference laws in Pennsylvania prior to 1940, see Op. Att'y. Gen. No. 320 at 192 (1940).
45. See, e.g, The Act of April 12, 1939, Pub. L. No. 22, 1939 Pa. Laws 27 (repealed).
46. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7101 (1976); Heskovitz v. State Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 534
A.2d 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
47. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 121 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit
in a footnote stated that "[tihe constitutionality of the preference of § 7104(b) ... is not before us,
nor does it appear, historically, to have ever been challenged on these grounds before the
Commonwealth's appellate courts." Id.
48. Appellee's Brief at 11-13, Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993)(No.
92-1483). The City raised the argument that based on Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83
A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951), the granting of preference in promotions was invalid under section 7104.
Appellee's Brief at I 1-13.
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unconstitutional. Ultimately, if the holding of Carter is to stand, the
issue of the constitutionality of granting preference in promotion must be
resolved by the Pennsylvania courts.
1. General Challenges to Veterans Preference Statutes. - In general,
the United States Supreme Court has held veterans' preference statutes to
be constitutional.4 9 In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney,5" a woman challenged an absolute veterans' preference
statute5' on grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by operating to exclude women from high
ranking civil service positions. The Massachusetts statute requires that
when a veteran passes a civil service exam, the veteran's name must be
automatically placed at the top of the list, even if a non-veteran has a
superior score.52  The Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts
veterans' preference statute does not unconstitutionally discriminate
against women even though the preference given is absolute and could be
49. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
50. Id. For an in depth look at the Feeney opinion see Lynn Williams Dischler, Note, I I
SETON HALL L. REV. 86 (1980); Pat Labbadia, III, The Veterans' Preference Statutes: Do They
Really Discriminate Against Women?, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 653 (1980).
51. "Absolute preference" requires that veterans who pass a civil service examination are
entitled to employment preference over all other candidates who pass the examination. John H.
Fleming & Charles A. Shanor, Veterans Preferences in Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender
Discrimination? 26 EMORY L.J. 13, 52 (1977)[hereinafter Fleming & Shanor]. Thus, a veteran who
barely passes an examination is entitled to a position over a non-veteran with a perfect score. Id.
While Fleming & Shanor put Pennsylvania in the category of an "Absolute Preference" state, Id at
17 n.13, this is not entirely correct. While certain sections of the Veterans' Preference Act may be
construed as granting "absolute preference," see infra note 137 and accompanying text, portions of
the Pennsylvania Veterans' Preference Act would fall into the "Point-Bonus Preferences" category
which includes those statutes that give veterans additional points towards their final score on civil
service exams. Fleiing & Shanor supra note 51, at 54; see 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7103 (1976
& Supp. 1990)(conferring ten additional points to veterans on Commonwealth civil service
examinations, and a 15% bonus on municipal civil service examinations).
52. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 1992). The statute also dictates an order of
preference for placement on the eligible list and reads as follows:
The names of persons who pass examinations for original appointment to any
position in the official service shall be placed on eligible lists in the following order:
(1) disabled veterans, in the order of their respective standings; (2) veterans, in the
order of their respective standings; (3) widows or widowed mothers of veterans who
were killed in action or died from a service connected disability incurred in wartime
service, in the order of their respective standings; (4) all others in the order of their
respective standings....
Id. The section does not apply to promotions, See MacCarthy v. Director of Civ. Serv., 64 N.E.2d
617 (Mass. 1946)(holding that the word "appointment" denotes only the original entry into the
classification and does not apply to promotions within that classification), although Massachusetts
does grant preference in promotions in other sections of its civil service act. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 31, § 3 (West 1992).
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1995
invoked continuously throughout a veteran's lifetime. 3 The Court held
that the statute is constitutional despite a showing that the statute
disproportionately favors males in hiring for civil service positions. 4
2. Equal Protection Challenges to the Pennsylvania's Veterans'
Preference Act. - Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, Pennsylvania's Veterans'
Preference Act of 1945" was challenged on similar grounds, that is, that
the act discriminated against women.56 In Feinerman v. Jones,57 the
plaintiff contended that the provision of the Veterans' Preference Act of
1945 that grants a ten point bonus to any veteran receiving a passing
grade on a civil service exam discriminated against women. 8 The court
determined that the right to be given fair consideration for public
employment is not a "fundamental right," and therefore applied a
"rational basis test" to determine the constitutionality of the Veterans'
Preference Act of 1945.59 The court found a rational basis for the
legislature's decision to give preference to veterans and concluded that
the alleged discrimination was unintentional.60 Consequently, the court
held that the Veterans' Preference Act of 1945 does not discriminate
against women and as a result is constitutional.6'
3. Other Challenges to Pennsylvania's Veterans' Preference Act. -
As a result of the decisions in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney and Feinerman v. Jones, veterans' preference statutes, including
Pennsylvania's, are not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
53. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256.
54. Id. at 281. Feeney demonstrated that only 1.8% of all Massachusetts women have
achieved veteran status and are afforded preference under the statute. Id. at 270. See also Fleming
& Shanor, supra note 51, at 13 n.3, setting forth Department of Defense statistics concerning the
number of women personnel in the armed forces for selected years from 1940 through 1976.
55. The Veterans' Preference Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 337, 1945 Pa. Laws 837[hereinafter
Veterans Preference Act of 1945], is identical to the current Veterans' Preference Act, 51 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7101-7109, as it was saved from repeal by Act of Oct. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 226,
1974 Pa. Laws 676, and was reenacted as the current Veterans Preference Act, Act of Aug. 1, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 92, 1975 Pa. Laws 233.
56. Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 255. The provision challenged was § 3 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1945,
1945 Pa. Laws 837, which is now 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7103(a) (1976 & Supp. 1990).
59. Feinerman, 356 F. Supp. at 258. See also Williams v. State Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 300 A.2d
799, 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)(holding that the right to government employment is not fundamental;
thus application of the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the Veterans' Preference
Act was appropriate).
60. Feinerman, 356 F. Supp at 258.
61. Id. at 262.
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However, certain preferences granted under the Veterans' Preference Act
have been held unconstitutional. This section addresses the constitutional
challenges to the individual preferences granted under the Veterans'
Preference Act.
(a) The constitutionality of granting preference before the veteran
achieves the minimum requirements for the position. - The first relevant
holding as to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Veterans' Preference
Act was set forth by In Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid.62 In
Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed the constitutionality
of a provision which gave veterans fifteen percent towards their score
prior to taking the civil service examination, thus allowing veterans to
receive lower passing grade than non-veterans." After looking at
veterans' preference laws in other states, the court determined that
veterans' preference acts were valid if they proscribe that a veteran
possess the minimum qualifications to perform the duties involved. 4
The minimum qualifications can be in the form of an examination, but
the preference must be given after the veteran receives a passing
grade. 5
The court likened the lowering of the veteran's passing grade to
exempting him or her from taking the exam, which had previously been
held unconstitutional in Pennsylvania." The court held the section of
the statute that gave veterans a fifteen percent credit in advance of taking
an examination to be unconstitutional.67 However, the court noted that
62. 3 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938).
63. Id. at 702-03. The court looked at section 4405 of the Third Class City Code, Pub. L. No.
317, § 4405, 1931 Pa. Laws 1111 (codified as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39405 (1957)).
When the court looked at that section in 1938, it was entitled "Grading for Discharged Soldiers or
Sailors" and read:
When any person who was engaged in the military or naval service of the United States
during any war in which the United States engaged, and has an honorable discharge
therefrom, shall take any examination for appointment or promotion, his examination
shall be marked or graded fifteen per centum perfect before the quality or contents of
the examination shall be considered. When the examination of any such person is
completed and graded, such grading or percentage as the examination merits shall be
added to the aforesaid fifteen per centum, and such total mark or grade shall represent
the final grade or classification of such person and shall determine his or her order of
standing on the eligible list.
Id.
64. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 705.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 706. In Wood v. Philadelphia, 46 Pa. Super. 573 (1911), the court held that a statute
exempting veterans and their widows and children from taking civil service exams was invalid as
there were no grounds for such a statute.
67. Schmid, 3 A.2d at 707.
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credit may be given to veterans who have passed an examination and are
placed on an eligible list.6"
The Schmid decision is fairly straightforward. It held that veterans'
preference is constitutional if the preference is applied after the veteran
meets the minimum qualifications for the position. However, the next
relevant decision regarding veterans' preference is where the veterans'
preference law begins to become unclear, and where the distinction
between preference in promotion and preference in appointment becomes
significant.
(b) The distinction between granting preference in appointments and
granting preference in promotions. - In Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v.
O'Neill,6 9 the court examined the constitutionality of the predecessor to
the present Veterans' Preference Act.70 Specifically, the plaintiff in
O'Neill challenged the constitutionality of the provision which gave
veterans a ten point bonus in promotional exams so long as the veteran
first passed the civil service exam.7 After reiterating their holding in
Schmid, that preference in appointments is constitutional, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that because there is a difference in
appointments and promotions, the awarding of a ten point preference to
veterans in promotions is unconstitutional.72  To determine the
constitutionality of the challenged provision, the court used the test laid
down in Schmid 3 which states:
[T]here must be some reasonable relation between the basis of
preference and the object to be obtained, the preference of veterans
for the proper performance of duties. Public policy, as well as
constitutional restrictions, prohibits an unrestrained preference as it
68. Id.
69. 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 195 1)(Stearne, J., dissenting).
70. See Veterans' Preference Act of 1945, 1945 Pa. Laws 837.
71. O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 382. The section challenged was section 3 of the Veterans Preference
Act of 1945, 1945 Pa. Laws 837, which is now section 7103(a) of the current Veterans' Preference
Act, 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7103(a) (1976 & Supp. 1990). That section states:
Whenever any soldier shall successfully pass a civil service appointment or promotional
examination ... such soldiers examination shall be marked or graded an additional ten
points above the mark or grade credited for the examination and the total mark... thus
obtained... shall determine his standing on any eligible or promotional list, certified
or furnished to the appointing or promoting power.
Id.
72. 0 'Neill, 83 A.2d at 384. "Promotion" is a change to a position within a civil service class
which has a higher maximum salary. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.3(u) (1990). While
"appointment" is not defined, it is generally construed as one's initial entry into a civil service class.
73. O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 383.
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does a preference credit based on factors not representative of their
true value.74
Relying on this test, the court noted that preference in appointments
is constitutional because the "discipline, experience and service" the
veterans obtain through their time in the service make them more
desirable for public positions that require discipline, loyalty and public
spirit. 5 However, the court concluded that granting preference in
promotions places too high a value on the benefit to public service from
military training.7 6 The court noted that as time passed, the benefit of
such service begina to diminish as both veterans and non-veterans become
proficient in their duties." Thus, the court held that granting the same
point preferences in promotions that are granted in appointments is
unjustified and highly prejudicial.78 Central to the court's holding is the
fact that appointments and promotions are distinguishable.79
Justice Stearne dissented, finding it impossible to hold the act
constitutional as applied to appointments but not promotions."0 He
found no distinction between appointments and promotions.8 ' However,
even if Justice Stearne accepted the notion that there is a distinction
between appointments and promotions, he determined that the Veterans'
Preference Act applied equally in both cases because discipline,
experience, and military service have the same potential value to
appointments as to promotions. 82 Justice Steame gave the example of
74. Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701, 704 (Pa. 1938)).
75. Id.
76. Id. The court again quoted Schmid in discussing the limitations placed on veterans'
preference. "[W]here war service is appraised, in the allotment of public positions, beyond its value,
and the preference goes beyond the scope of the actual advantages gained in such service, the
classification becomes void and the privilege is held unreasonable and arbitrary." O'Neill, 83 A.2d
at 383 (quoting Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 384.
80. Id. One commentator also questioned the majority's distinction between appointments and
promotions. See Recent Case, 65 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1952). The commentator noted that the
legislation should not have been invalidated unless it was so unreasonable that it rebutted the
presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 506. Questioning the superiority of the veteran over the non-
veteran, the commentator wrote "if a court chooses to accept the somewhat forced concept of the
veteran's superior capacities, it seems unwise for it then to undertake the essentially legislative
function of determining the value of those qualities." Id. at 507.
81. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1951)(Steame, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stearne relied on Pittsburgh Sch. Dist. Appeal, 52 A.2d 17 (Pa. 1947), in
reaching this conclusion. There the court noted that a promotion is really the surrender of one
position and an appointment to a higher one. Id. at 19.
82. 0 'Neill, 83 A.2d at 385. The Connecticut Supreme Court took a similar view to that of
Justice Steame in State ex rel. Higgins v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of Bridgeport, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).
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positions in the fire department and posed the question: how can military
training and experience be of value to the hoseman, but military training
as a captain, major, or colonel, not be of value to the fire chief? 3
Justice Stearne also noted that for the majority's holding to be
correct and the act to be unconstitutional, there must be an unreasonable
classification resulting from preference to veterans in promotions. 4 For
there to be an unreasonable classification, the non-veteran must "catch
up" to the veteran by the time promotional exams are taken so that there
is no justification for granting preference to the veteran., 5  Justice
Stearne stated that in a vast number of cases, the non-veteran does not
catch up with the veteran, as the non-veteran does not necessarily acquire
the loyalty, experience, and discipline the veteran possesses before being
promoted to a position.8" Nor was there evidence before the court to
show the classification was unreasonable or that the non-veteran "catches
up" with the veteran. 7
Finally, Justice Steame noted that the legislature enacted the section
because veterans are unable to take promotional exams while in military
service, and the Veterans' Preference Act compensates for this fact.88
He also noted that courts in other states have upheld veterans' preference
in promotions.8 9
4. The Constitutionality of Granting Preference in Promotions in
Pennsylvania. - Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in
O'Neill, in 1975 the state legislature re-enacted the Veteran's Preference
Act of 1945 with the identical language, including the provision giving
ten points to veterans in promotional examinations.9" However, re-
In upholding preference in promotions, the court refused to take the position of the O'Neill majority
because they felt the qualities gained in military service did not merely evaporate, but continued to
remain with the veteran and afforded the same potential value in promotions and appointments.
Higgins, 90 A.2d at 866.





88. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa. 1951)(Stearne, J.,
dissenting).
89. Id. (citing Jones v. O'Toole, 212 P. 9 (Cal. 1923); Herman v. Sturgeon, 293 N.W. 488
(Iowa 1940); Geyer v. Triplett, 22 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1946); Zanfes v. Olson, 7 N.W.2d 901 (Iowa
1943); Opinion of the Justices; 85 N.E.2d 238 (Mass. 1949); Bateman v. March, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); cf. Cook v. Mason, 283 P. 891 (Cal. Dist. App. Ct. 1929); Goodrich v.
Mitchell 75 P. 1034 (Kan. 1904); State ex rel. King v. Emmons, 190 N.E. 468 (Ohio 1934)).
90. See compare Veterans' Preference Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 337, 1945 Pa. Laws 837 with
Veterans' Preference Act, 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101-7109.
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enacting the provision did not make it constitutional or give it new
validity.9 As a result, the ten point provision found in section 7103 of
the Veterans' Preference Act is still unconstitutional as applied to
promotions according to O'Neill.
Despite the holding of O'Neill, the issue remains undecided as to
whether all veterans' preference in promotion is unconstitutional in
Pennsylvania. If the O'Neill decision is read broadly, it would seem that
veterans' preference in Pennsylvania, as applied to promotions, is
unconstitutional altogether.92 One could argue that because the court
reasoned that as time passes the advantages received from military
training diminish, veterans' preference in promotion can not be
constitutionally applied in any instance.93 The court stated that the
advantages gained by veterans from their military training is of "very
little importance" to promotions.94 However, the court contradicted this
statement when it stated that in some promotional instances military
training can render veterans superior candidates.95 A sounder reading
of O'Neill reveals that while the ten point provision is unconstitutional,
veterans' preference in promotion as a whole remains in tact.9 6 The
91. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(4) (Supp. 1993); In re Buhl's Estate, 150 A. 86 (Pa.
1930)(holding that the general rule is that when a later act is adopted using the same language as the
prior act which has been construed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the presumption is that
the repeated language is to be construed the same manner as in the earlier statute); In re Estate of
Lock, 244 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1968)(same). The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides "[tihat when
a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in
subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such
language." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(4).
92. The Philadelphia City Solicitor read O'Neill as denying veterans' preference in promotion
in any instance. Op. City Solicitor No. 119 (April 15, 1954). In that opinion, the city solicitor
addressed the question of whether, after O'Neill, any preference in promotion could be granted to
veterans other then the 10 point bonus. Id. The city solicitor stated:
Conceivably, the holding of the O'Neill case could be limited to the granting of
the ten-point bonus on promotional examinations with the result that other preferential
treatment might be accorded to veterans, since the specific holding in the O'Neill case
concerned only the ten-point bonus. However, the reasoning of the majority would
apply to all preferences which might be granted on promotion....
This reasoning would negate preferences in appointments. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission has followed this view in interpreting the
Veterans' Preference Act. As a result, veterans employed by the Commonwealth are
granted no preference in promotion appointments.
Id.
93. See Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Pennsylvania Attorney General has not gone so far as to say that all preference in
promotions are unconstitutional. Cf Op. Atty. Gen. No. 76-17 (1976) (addressing whether the 10
point provision as applied to promotions was now valid because the General Assembly re-enacted
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court state quite clearly, "We can come only to the conclusion that,
because of the difference between an original appointment and a
promotion, the award of the ten percentage point preference to veterans
in examinations for promotions is unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional .,
Additionally, the court's holding was based on the fact that the ten
point preference given in promotions was equivalent to that given in
appointments, and the legislature had no reason to give equal preference
when there is a distinction between appointments and promotions.98
Thus, the court left open the possibility of giving some lesser degree of
preference to veterans in promotions than in appointments, so long as
there is a reasonable relation between the preference granted and the
performance of the public duties. 99
When the O'Neill decision is examined in the context of decisions
construing its opinion, one can see that the holding was restricted to
finding the ten point provision unconstitutional as applied to promotions
rather than finding veterans' preference in promotions unconstitutional
as a whole. As the next subsection discusses, a more recent decision has
potentially expanded the test used to determine the constitutionality of
granting veterans' preference found in O'Neill.
(a) Potential expansion of the Schmid test. - Northeastern
Educational Intermediate Unit #19 v. Stephens"°° expanded the notion
that a rational relation must exist between the preference due and the
position sought.'0 ' In Stephens, the court construed section 7107 of the
Veterans' Preference Act, which deals with computing seniority for
reducing the work force.1°2 A schoolteacher, who was a veteran, was
it). The Attorney General read O 'Neill to hold that the 10 point provision as applied to promotional
examinations was unconstitutional. Id. The Attorney General did not state that the O 'Neill decision
held that all preferences in promotion were unconstitutional as the Philadelphia City Solicitor did in
1954. See Id; cf supra note 92.
97. O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 383 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. See Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701, 704 (Pa. 1938)).
100. 510 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
101. See Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704.
102. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107 (1976) is entitled "Computation of seniority for
reduction in force." That section states:
Whenever a reduction in force is necessary in any public position, or on public works
of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, and personnel are discharged
according to seniority, the number of years of service of any soldier shall be
determined by adding his total years of service in the civil service or on public works
to his total years of service as a member of the armed forces of the United States, or
in any women's organization officially connected therewith during any war in which
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furloughed because he did not receive credit for his time served in the
military.0 3  Had he received such credit, he would have kept his
position.0 4 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld the lower
court's decision to reinstate the veteran because he should have received
credit for his time served in the military in computing his seniority.'0 5
In construing the constitutionality of section 7107, the
Commonwealth Court stated it did not need to find a nexus between the
military experience and the position, because the a situation did not
involve a change in actual status as occurs when someone is appointed or
promoted. 0 6  Instead, the court examined the provision on equal
protection grounds and determined that the provision compensates the
veteran for the disadvantage he suffered due to his exclusion from the
labor market during his time of service. 0 7  The court stated that
compensating the veteran for lost time "is a reasonable government
objective which bears a rational relationship to the method employed, and
hence the application of the Act to the instant situation withstands
constitutional scrutiny."' l5
Stephens seems to expand the notion that the preference given must
bear a relation to the position sought, since the court determined that
compensating the veteran for lost time is a reasonable legislative
objective. It is unclear, however, whether the holding would apply to
preference in promotions, as the court appeared to limit its holding to the
furlough provision.' °9
(b) Carter and the constitutionality of preference in promotions. -
The courts have not yet resolved whether preference in promotions is
the United States engaged.
Id.
103. Stephens, 510 A.2d at 1269.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1273.
106. Id. The court examined Schmid and O'Neill and determined that the reason a nexus was
required between military performance and the position sought in order for the preference to be
constitutional was because an appointment or promotion involves an actual change in status of the
veteran which could enhance him to the detriment of the Commonwealth. Id. In cases of furlough,
the veteran's status is not being enhanced, but only maintained, and the veteran has already
established that there is no possible detriment to the Commonwealth. Stephens, 510 A.2d at 1273.
107. Id. Compensation or "rehabilitation" is one of several justifications used by legislatures
for granting veterans preference. Fleming & Shanor, supra note 51, at 48-50. In addition, "reward,"
"job-relatedness," and "inducement" are also used as justifications for granting veterans' preference.
Id.
108. Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit #19 v. Stephens, 510 A.2d 1267, 1273 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986).
109. Id.
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constitutional in Pennsylvania, although it appears that some preference
in promotion could be constitutional even under O'Neill. Ultimately, if
Carter stands the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must address the question
of whether veterans' preference in promotion is constitutional.
Although O'Neill found that the ten-point provision of the Veterans'
Preference Act was invalid as applied to promotions," l0 the act contains
other provisions that grant preference in promotions.' These
provisions have never been held unconstitutional and still seem to require
preference to be given to veterans whose names appear on a promotional
list." If veterans' preference in promotions is constitutional, courts
must determine what preference is due in promotions under the Veterans'
Preference Act, an issue addressed in the next subpart.
C. What Preference is Due?
Assuming that the Carter decision stands and veterans' preference
in promotion is constitutional, the next issue concerns what preference is
due to veterans on promotional lists."' The Carter court remanded to
the district court to make this determination." 4  Because there is
virtually no authority in Pennsylvania dealing with the issue of veterans'
preference in promotion, one can only speculate as to how a court will
determine this issue."15
110. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. 1951).
I11. See, e.g., 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104 (1976).
112. See 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104.
113. The Carter decision specifically addressed the preference under 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7104 and concluded that preference in promotion was due under that section. Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
114. Id. Carter was settled prior to the district court making such a determination. See Docket
for Carter v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 91-7502 (E.D. Pa. filed May 13, 1992).
115. In response to the Carter decision, the City of Philadelphia now grants preference in
promotions. See Amendments to Phila. Civ. Serv. Regs. §§ 9.024, 11 (Approved Oct. 19, 1994).
Section 11 now reads:
11.10 VETERANS' PREFERENCE FOR ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT OR
PROMOTIONS. In those cases where the two (2) eligibles certified to fill a vacancy
are veterans and/or non-veterans, the following conditions shall control:
11.101 Where two (2) veterans are certified, either may be appointed.
11.102 Where a veteran and non-veteran are certified from an open-
competitive eligible list, the veteran shall be appointed, provided,
however, that if the veteran declines the appointment, the appointing
authority may either appoint the non-veteran or demand another eligible
to replace the declination.
11.103 Whenever any veteran possesses the requisite qualifications, and
his or her name appears on a promotional list from which certifications
are to be made, the veteran shall be given the preference of having the
weighted average equivalent of one (1) additional year of seniority added
to their final score for purposes of determining who may be certified as
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It is clear from O'Neill that the ten point provision of the Veterans'
Preference Act is unconstitutional as applied to promotional exams.116
Thus, it would seem futile to argue that the ten-point provision still
applies to promotions, despite the legislature's reenactment of that
provision." 7 However, section 7104 of the Veterans' Preference Act,
on which the Carter was decided, still seems applicable to promotions
until a Pennsylvania court rules otherwise.' 8 The next section will
analyze the preference due in promotions under section 7104 of the
Veterans' Preference Act. This subpart attempts to predict what veterans'
preference in promotion is due, if any, under the Veterans' Preference
Act.
1. Attempting to Predict Preference Due in Promotions Under
Section 7104 of the Veterans' Preference Act. - To determine the
preference due in promotions under section 7104, it is helpful to examine
the decisions construing that section. Although these decisions deal with
appointments, rather than promotions, they may help to predict the
preference due in promotions under section 7104 should Carter stand.
eligible to be considered for the promotion, notwithstanding that, without
such preference, his or her name may not stand high enough on the
promotional list to warrant certification. Where a veteran and non-veteran
are certified from a promotional eligible list, the appointing authority
shall give appropriate consideration to each certified applicant's
qualifications; records of performance, seniority and conduct; preference
as a veteran; and any other job-related criteria. Based on these factors the
appointing authority may select either the veteran or non-veteran.
11.104 Where two (2) non-veterans are certified, either non-veteran may
be appointed.
116. See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
118. Paragraph (b) of section 7104 is set out supra note 20. The remainder of this section reads
as follows:
(a) Non-civil service. - Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite qualifications and
is eligible to appointment to or promotion in a public position, where no such civil
service examination is required, the appointing power in making an appointment to or
a promotion to a public position shall give preference to such soldier.
(c) Name not on civil service list. - In making an appointment or promotion to public
office where a civil service examination is required, the appointing or promotional
power may give preference to any soldier, who has passed the required examination for
appointment or promotion to such position, and possesses the requisite qualifications,
although his name does not appear on the eligible or promotional list certified or
furnished to the appointing or promoting power.
51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(a),(c) (1976)(emphasis added).
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(a) Mandatory preference in appointments under section 7104 of the
Veterans' Preference Act. - In Rasmussen v. Borough of Aspinwall, "9
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania examined section 7104(b) of
the Veterans' Preference Act as it applies to appointments. The court
held that a veteran who receives the highest score on an appointment
examination, after receiving the ten-poiht preference, must be hired in
accordance with section 7104(b) of the Veterans' Preference Act.'
20
Rasmussen was a veteran who applied for a position as a patrolman
with the Aspinwall Police Department. 2 ' After receiving the highest
score on the civil service examination after the ten-point preference was
applied, he was certified for selection along with the second and third
ranking test takers.'22 The Borough did not hire Rasmussen, but rather
chose one of the other two applicants, who were both non-veterans.
23
After the Borough reaffirmed its decision to hire the non-veteran,
Rasmussen filed suit contending that pursuant to section 7104(b) of the
Veterans' Preference Act, he must be hired over the non-veterans. 24
The Common Pleas Court rejected Rasmussen's argument and granted the
Borough's motion for summary judgment. 2s
The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that when one of the
persons certified from an eligible list is a veteran, section 7104 requires
that the veteran be chosen over the non-veteran.2 6  The court stated
that in section 7104(b), the use of the word "shall" commands that the
council appoint the certified veteran if he or she is one of the three on the




123. Id. at 1075.
124. Rasmussen v. Borough of Aspinwall, 519 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1076.
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certified list.'27 Thus, section 7104(b) confers mandatory preference to
veterans in appointments if their names appear on a certified list.
(b) Expansion of the notion of mandatory preference under section
7104. - The notion of mandatory preference under section 7104 was
further expanded in Brickhouse v. Spring Ford Area School District.'28
The Commonwealth Court construed section 7104(a) of the Veterans'
Preference Act relating to non-civil service positions. 129  Relying on
Rasmussen, the court held that because section 7104(a) used the word
"shall" in the same manner as it was used in section 7104(b), the
preference granted under section 7104(a) was mandatory. 30
Brickhouse was a veteran who applied for a position as a social
studies schoolteacher.' 3 ' He met the minimum qualifications required
for the position, but had only one year of experience teaching social
studies in the eleven years following his graduation from college.
13 2
The school board decided to hire a highly qualified non-veteran who had
superior credentials.'33 Brickhouse brought suit after the school board
refused to grant him veterans' preference and hire him for the
position.'34 The court held that because Brickhouse met the minimum
127. Id. Section ll84ofthe BoroughCode, ActofFebruary 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 581,§ 1184,
1965 Pa. Laws 1656, 1734 (codified as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46184 (Supp. 1993)),
requires that one of the three names on the certified list be hired. That section states:
[T]he council shall notify the commission of any vacancy which is to be filled and shall
request the certification of a list of eligibles. The commission shall certify for each
existing vacancy from the eligible list, the names of three persons . . . who have
received the highest average. The council shall thereupon, with sole reference to the
merit and fitness of candidates, make an appointment from the three names certified.
Id. (emphasis added). If a veteran is one of the three certified, he must be hired. Rasmussen, 519
A.2d at 1076. The word "shall" found in section 7104(b) was contrasted with section 7104(c) which
uses the word "may." Id. The court concluded that under 7104(b), which deals with veterans who
have been certified as the result of their civil service, the awarding of preference is mandatory, rather
than discretionary as it is in 7104(c), which deals with the situation when the veteran is not certified
but remains on the eligible list. Id.; Compare 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(b), with 51 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(c). Section 7104(c) allows the appointing or promoting authority to go
outside the certified list and pick a veteran for a position, so long as the veteran has met the
minimum requirements, Le., passes the test. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(c).
128. 625 A.2d 711 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
129. Id. Non-civil service positions are those in which there is no examination or list of
eligibles involved in the hiring process. Id. at 714.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 712.
132. Brickhouse v. Spring Ford Area Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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qualifications, he must be hired, even over a teacher with superior
qualifications.35
Brickhouse represents one of the most expansive veterans' preference
decisions. According to Brickhouse, if a veteran meets the minimum
requirements and applies for a non-civil service position, a veteran must
be hired over any non-veteran as mandated in section 7104(a).'36
Because it is clear that section 7104 confers mandatory veterans'
preference in appointments, the next question is whether this mandatory
preference applies to promotions.
2. Does the mandatory preference conferred under 7104 apply to
promotions?. - The Brickhouse and Rasmussen decisions conclude that the
preference granted under sections 7104(a) and (b) is mandatory. Because
neither section has been found unconstitutional as to promotions, it
follows that any veteran on a promotional certified list must be given
preference in hiring decisions.
However, the Third Circuit in Carter refused to say that section
7104 is mandatory as applied to promotions. The Third Circuit stated
that if the defendant could show a valid reason for promoting the lower
ranking individuals over Carter, then passing him over for the promotion
was not necessarily improper.'37  Additionally, the mandatory
preference granted under section 7104 does not appear to be
constitutional as applied to promotions. If such preference were granted,
it would be equal to the preference granted in appointments, which is
clearly unconstitutional under O'Neill.3 Thus, what preference under
section 7104 can be granted constitutionally according to O'Neill? The
following subsection addresses this question.
(a) Applying section 7104 to promotions within the constitutional
parameters set by O'Neill. - If preference in promotions is granted under
section 7104, the preference must be constitutional. Under O'Neill, the
preference granted in appointments must not be the same as the
preference granted in promotions.'39 Additionally, Schmid and O'Neill
hold that a rational relation must exist between the preference granted and
135. Id.
136. Because of this holding, section 7104(a) could be construed as granting "absolute
preference" as defined in Fleming & Shanor, supra note 51.
137. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
138. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. 1951)(Steame, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id.
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the position being sought. 4 ' So, if the courts construe veterans'
preference in promotion as valid, a system will have to be developed to
grant this preference in a constitutional manner.
One way to grant preference in promotion would be to give
preference under the "Rule of Three." The "Rule of Three" requires that
the top three scoring individuals on an eligible list be certified for a
vacancy, 4' The appointing or promoting authority then must choose
one of these top three individuals for the position.142 This ensures that
an individual with one of the top three scores is appointed or promoted
to the position. Under section 7104 of the Veterans' Preference Act, if
any of those individuals is a veteran, the veteran must be appointed.'
43
The same could apply to promotions, although in practice it does not.
144
Under O'Neill, veterans may not receive additional points on
promotional examinations. Thus, if a veteran achieved a ranking in the
top three, it would be on his or her own merits, rather than by the
addition of ten points as conferred in appointments. The veteran would
prove that he or she is a superior candidate without the aid of veterans'
preference points. Section 7104 would then require that the veteran be
hired over the other certified individuals.
Whether such a preference would be constitutional under Schmid and
O'Neill is not clear. However, it seems that such a preference would
almost certainly be constitutional under the Commonwealth Court's
interpretation of Schmid and O'Neill in Northeastern Educational
Intermediate Unit # 19 v. Stephens."' Recall that in Stephens, the
140. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701, 704 (Pa. 1938).
141. The "Rule of Three" is statutory, and is contained in the Civil Service Act. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 741.601 (1990). That section reads as follows:
Whenever a vacancy is likely to occur or is to be filled in a permanent position in the
classified service, the appointing authority shall submit to the director a statement
indicating the position to be filled. . . . the director shall thereupon certify to the
appointing authority the names of three eligibles willing to accept appointment who are
highest on the appropriate promotion list or employment list....
Id. Similar provisions are contained in the civil service laws relating to cities of the second class,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23446 (1957), cities of the third class, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39406
(Supp. 1993), and boroughs, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46184 (Supp. 1993). The term "rule of three"
is misleading because ties are included among the top three ranking individuals, thus more than three
individuals may be certified.
142. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.602 (1990).
143. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(b) (1976).
144. Under State Civil Service Regulation 580.21 enacted February 12, 1992, veterans'
preference applies only to appointments and not promotions, thus, even though the "Rule of Three"
is used in both appointments and promotions, veterans' preference is only granted in appointments.
145. 510 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). See supra notes
100-09 and accompanying text.
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Commonwealth Court stated that the reason for the nexus requirement
between military experience and the position applied for is because of a
possible detriment to the Commonwealth by change of the veteran's
actual status. 46 However, under the "Rule of Three" scenario just
posed, the Commonwealth experiences no detriment because it has
already been determined that the veteran is one of the three most
qualified individuals for the position on his or her own merits.
The promotion of a veteran could be rationally construed as
compensating a veteran for the time spent in the military because the
veteran was out of the labor market and did not have the opportunity to
be promoted during that time lost.'47 This preference could even be
considered a reward for his military service.'48 Additionally, in some
cases there would be a rational relation between the veteran's military
training and the position sought if, for example, the position is one
involving leadership, the use of a firearm, or combat type skills.'
(b) Applying preference under the "Rule of Three" in practice. -
The application of section 7104 to the "Rule of Three," while
theoretically seeming to be a sensible solution to granting preference in
promotions, would not always work in practice. In granting promotions,
146. Id. at 1273.
147. The rationale presented in Stephens explaining why veterans preference is valid to add
seniority to prevent furlough of veterans is to compensate the veteran for the disadvantage he would
have suffered from his exclusion from the labor market. Id. at 1273. The veteran who was not in
the labor market may be disadvantaged when it comes to promotional decisions because he may have
inferior experience in terms of years served in the prior position, or in the number of years in civil
service.
148. Reward can be the only rationale for section 7105 entitled "Lack of training, age, or
physical impairment." 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7105 (1976). That section states:
The lack of academic or scholastic training or experience, age, loss of limb or other
physical impairment which does not in fact incapacitate any such soldier shall not be
deemed to disqualify him, provided he possesses the other requisite qualifications to
satisfactorily perform all of the duties which the position requires.
Id. One of the most interesting cases construing this section's predecessor is Maloney v. Borough
of Yeadon, 50 Del. C. 33, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (1963). In that case, a veteran fell short of the
minimum height requirements by two and one-quarter inches. Id. The court held that because the
section now construed as 7105 requires a veteran not be disqualified because of physical impairment
if he or she meets all of the other qualifications, the height requirement was waived as to the veteran,
and he was awarded the position. Id. Thus, it could be stated that veterans' preference caused
Maloney to grow two and one-quarter inches.
Additionally, reward can be the only justification for preferring spouses of deceased or
disabled soldiers. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7108 (1976 & Supp. 1993). Section 7108 says "[tihe
same preferential rating given to soldiers under the provisions of this chapter shall be extended to
include the spouses of deceased or disabled soldiers." Id.
149. See Justice Stearne's dissent in O'Neill discussed supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
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civil service exams and the "Rule of Three" are not always used in
deciding who is certified. 5'
Other methods of certification do not involve examinations but are
based on merit and minimum qualifications. Using these other methods
results in certified lists comprised of all those individuals who have met
certain minimum qualifications. The effect of granting mandatory
preference when these other methods are used would result in a situation
similar to that in Brickhouse, if the veteran met the minimum
qualifications, he or she would have to be promoted. This may be
unconstitutional under O'Neill, as the result would be to grant equal, if
not greater, preference in promotions than in appointments.
If granting veterans' preference were limited only to those
promotional situations when the "Rule of Three" were used, hiring
agencies would simply use other methods to compile their certified lists
to avoid having to grant the preference. Thus, while granting preference
within the "Rule of Three" may appear to be a logical solution to granting
veterans' preference in promotions, the result is not realistic. However,
the next subsection which examines the discretionary preference of
section 7104(c), may provide the realistic and logical solution that is
needed.
(c) Discretionary preference as a logical solution. - The most
logical and realistic solution to granting preference in promotions under
section 7104 of the Veterans' Preference Act is the discretionary
preference of 7104(c), which allows an appointing or promotional power
to go outside a certified list to chose a veteran. 151  Section 7104(c)
allows a hiring authority to go outside a certified list to choose a veteran
only if the veteran has met the minimum qualifications.' This would
appear to be constitutional if there is a reasonable relation between the
job and military service, such as in the example of the promotion of a
police officer to a swat team. It would certainly seem that military
training may be of great benefit to the position, and in that case, it seems
fair to allow an appointing or promoting officer to go outside the certified
list to promote a veteran as long as the minimum requirements are met.
150. The Civil Service Act allows "promotion based on meritorious service and seniority to be
accomplished without examination, if(i) the person has completed his probationary period in the next
lower position, (ii) he meets the minimum requirements for the higher position, and (iii) he receives
the unqualified recommendation of both his immediate superior and the appointing authority of his
department or agency. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.501 (1978).
151. See 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104(c) (1976), supra note 118.
152. Id.
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Additionally, hiring authorities prefer discretionary preference to
mandatory preference.
D. So Where Do Carter and Veterans' Preference Stand?
Until it is finally determined whether veterans' preference in
promotions is constitutional in Pennsylvania, Carter stands on shaky
ground. However, a logical look at the decisions relating to the
constitutionality of veterans' preference seems to indicate that preference
in promotion could be constitutional in certain instances. To hold that
preference in promotion is unconstitutional in all instances is an unfair
reading of the O'Neill decision and would render many legislative
veterans' preference policies extinct.
The question of what preference is due in promotions is an even
more difficult question if one does not know whether preference in
promotion is constitutional. Applying the mandatory preference required
under section 7104 to promotions seem to be unconstitutional under
O'Neill. If the legislature decides that it would like to continue to afford
veterans' preference in promotions, the legislature should determine what
constitutional preference is due.
Until the constitutionality of veterans' preference is determined,
Carter means little in the area of veterans' preference. But if it is
determined that veterans' preference in promotion is constitutional, Carter
has given veterans a constitutionally protected property interest in
receiving preference in promotion, which is a major victory for veterans'
preference in Pennsylvania.
IV. The Carter Decision, the Exclusivity of the Veterans' Preference
Act and Home Rule
The Carter decision also held that the Veterans' Preference Act is
the exclusive veterans' preference law in Pennsylvania. The Third
Circuit based this decision on the Home Rule Act.'53 This part of the
Comment discusses the Carter decision's affect on home rule
municipalities and their civil service regulations as they relate to veterans'
preference. Subpart A will briefly describe the concept of home rule and
its history in Pennsylvania. Subpart B will discuss Carter's holding as
it relates to home rule municipalities.
153. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993). See First Class City Home
Rule Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 13101-13157 (1949 & Supp. 1993)
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A. What is Home Rule?
Home rule has a relatively recent history in Pennsylvania, although
the Pennsylvania Constitution allowed cities of the first class to adopt
home rule as early as 1922.' 54 Philadelphia was the first city permitted
to adopt home rule,'55  and today all municipalities in the
Commonwealth are permitted to adopt home rule.'56  Although
precisely defining home rule may not be easy,'57 the concept is not
difficult: "the source of authority to act in specified areas is transferred
from the state and various municipal codes to the individual municipality
and its home rule charter.'058  One specified area where the
Commonwealth has transferred authority to municipalities is in the area
of civil service' 59
B. Application of the Veterans' Preference Act to Home Rule
Municipalities.
The Third Circuit concluded that the Veterans' Preference Act is the
exclusive veterans' preference law in Pennsylvania. 6 °  The court
154. Gary E. French, Home Rule in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REv. 265,268 (1977)[hereinafter
French]. See id. at 266-270, for a complete history of home rule in Pennsylvania.
155. The Home Rule Amendment to the PA. CONST., art. XV, § I (repealed 1968), conferred
the power on the Pennsylvania Legislature to adopt Home Rule. The amendment provides: "Cities
... may be given [by the legislature] the right and power to frame and adopt their own charters and
to exercise the powers and authority of local self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions,
limitations, and regulations, as may be imposed by the Legislature." Philadelphia's Home Rule
Charter went into effect on January 7, 1952. See Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa. 1953).
156. French, supra note 154, at 265. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-101 to 1-1309 (1974 &
Supp. 1993).
157. Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 269, 279 (1968).
158. French, supra note 154, at 265.
159. See Lennox v. Clark, 93 A.2d 834 (Pa. 1953); Ebald v. City of Philadelphia, 128 A.2d 352
(Pa. 1957). In Lennox, the court stated:
There seems to exist an erroneous impression . regarding section 18 of the Home
Rule Act which forbids the city to exercise powers contrary to powers granted by acts
of the General Assembly applicable in every part of the Commonwealth or to all cities
of the Commonwealth .... limitations of power referred to in section 18 concern only
laws in relation to substantive matters of State-wide concern, such as the health, safety,
security and general welfare of all the inhabitants of the State, and not to matters
affecting merely the personnel and administration of the offices local to Philadelphia
and which are of no concern to citizens elsewhere.
Id. at 845 (emphasis in original). The framers of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter intended
matters affecting personnel administration to be governed by their own civil service regulations.
Ebald, 128 A.2d at 354; see Philadelphia Home Rule Charter Sections 7.7-400 and 7.7-401 (codified
at 351 PA. CODE §§ 7.7-400 & 7.7-401 (1992)).
160. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 121-122 (3d Cir. 1993). See Exclusivity
Section, 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7109 (1976).
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determined that, because home rule forbids a participating city or
municipality to make laws contrary to the acts of the General Assembly
or the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions,161 the City of
Philadelphia was required to follow the Veterans' Preference Act and was
unable to make its own laws concerning veterans' preference.
6
1
Although generally cities and municipalities can govern in the area
of civil service, 63 they cannot contradict the acts of the General
Assembly." Prior to the decision in Carter, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court decided that, because the Borough Code'65
provided for the appointment and promotions of police officers, a
Borough may not make its own rules governing this area, despite being
under home rule.166 This pronouncement by the Commonwealth Court
makes it clear that promoting police officers is not a purely municipal
function. 1
67
Because of the Commonwealth Court's ruling and the exclusivity
section of the Veterans' Preference Act, it was clear to the Third Circuit
in Carter that the City of Philadelphia had violated the Home Rule Act
in adopting its own veterans' preference law. 68  Carter, in ruling that
the Veterans' Preference Act applies to the City of Philadelphia, merely
reaffirmed the rule that a home rule city or municipality may not make
laws contrary to acts of the General Assembly. 69  The Veterans'
Preference Act is explicit in that it is the exclusive veterans' preference
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 13131 (1949). That section entitled "General grant of power and
authority" states:
The charter of any city adopted or amended in accordance with this act may
provide for a form or system of municipal government and for the exercise of any and
all powers relating to its municipal functions, not inconsistent with the Constitution of
the United States or of this Commonwealth.
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 13133 (1949), entitled "Limitations,"
provides "[n]otwithstanding the grant of powers contained in this act, no city shall exercise powers
contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted by acts of the General Assembly
which are: ... (b) Applicable in every part of the Commonwealth. (c) Applicable to all the cities
of the Commonwealth." (emphasis added).
162. Carter, 989 F.2d at 122.
163. See supra note 161.
164. See supra note 161.
165. Borough Code, Pub. L. No. 58, 1965 Pa. Laws 1656 (codified as amended PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 45101-48501 (1966)).
166. Norristown Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 31 v. DeAngelis, 611 A.2d 322 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992).
167. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1993).
168. Id. at 122.
169. See supra note 161.
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law in Pennsylvania, but the City of Philadelphia chose to ignore this in
adopting its own civil service regulations.70
Thus, home rule municipalities are not free to enact any laws
without restriction in governing their own citizens. The restrictions
placed on them are real, not illusory. If the legislature wishes to govern
an area of the law on a statewide basis, the home rule municipality must
conform to the legislature's wishes. Ultimately the result reached in
Carter, that the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation denying veterans'
preference in promotion was invalid, was correct.
IV. Conclusion
The Carter decision could have a great impact on veterans'
preference, but the decision has two weaknesses. First, the decision
failed to address whether veterans' preference in promotion is
constitutional in Pennsylvania, thus holding that veterans have a
constitutionally protected property interest in something that is potentially
unconstitutional. Second, the court failed to determine what preference
is to be afforded veterans in promotions. Until it is determined whether
veterans' preference in promotion is constitutional, the decision should
not have much impact except to confuse the area of veterans' preference
even further.
If veterans' preference in promotion is held to be constitutional, the
Carter decision is obviously a great expansion of veterans' preference
rights. Veterans in Pennsylvania will have a constitutionally protected
property interest in receiving preference, and if denied such a right, will
be able to make out a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Obviously, if
veterans' preference in promotion is held to be unconstitutional, the
decision will have no impact whatsoever.
The Carter decision did, however, clear up one area of veterans'
preference law in Pennsylvania when it held that the Veterans' Preference
Act is the exclusive veterans' preference law in Pennsylvania. This
holding is firmly based in home rule analysis, and municipalities must
take note that they are not entitled to make their own provisions in the
area of veterans' preference.
The future of Carter and veterans' preference then is uncertain at
best. If anything, the Carter decision has sent out a signal that there are
many issues regarding veterans' preference that need to be addressed by
170. In a telephone interview with the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission (October 19,
1993), it was noted that prior to Carter, Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations have never granted
preference in promotion since their adoption in 1952.
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both the Pennsylvania courts and legislature. It seems the battle over
veterans' preference in Pennsylvania has just begun.
Keith S. Marlowe
